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An Overview of the State of Citizens' Knowledge About Politics
Abstract
In a letter to W. T. Barry, James Madison wrote that "a popular government, without popular information or
the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both." Much like Madison's
words to Barry, the title of this book Communicating Politics: Engaging the Public in Democratic Life-is based on
two principal assumptions: that an informed public is crucial to democracy; and that the key to assuring such
a public is the availability of engaging yet informative and accessible campaign communication. While many
of the studies and essays contained in this volume are devoted to assessing, and making recommendations for
improving, the current state of campaign communication, this chapter provides an overview of what
Americans know about politics and why it matters. The information presented here draws heavily from my
previous work in this area (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The literature on political knowledge provides fairly
compelling evidence for five characterizations regarding what Americans know: (1) the average American is
poorly informed but not uninformed; (2) aggregate levels of political knowledge have remained relatively stable
over the past 50 years; (3) Americans appear to be slightly less informed about politics than are citizens of
other comparable nations; (4) "average" levels of knowledge mask important differences across groups; and
(5) knowledge is tied to many attributes of "good" citizenship.
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CHAPTER 2 Michael X. Delli Carpini
An Overview of the State of Citizens'
Knowledge About Politics
In a letter to W T. Barry, James Madison wrote that "a popular government, without
popular information or the means ofacquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a trag-
edy, or perhaps both." Much like Madison's words to Barry, the title of this book-
"Communicating Politics: Engaging the Public in Democratic Life"-is based on two
principal assumptions: that an informed public is crucial to democracy; and that the
key to assuring such a public is the availability ofengaging yet informative and access-
ible campaign communication. While many of the studies and essays contained in
this volume are devoted to assessing, and making recommendations for improving,
the current state of campaign communication, this chapter provides an overview of
what Americans know about politics and why it matters. The information presented
here draws heavily from my previous work in this area (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).
The literature on political knowledge provides fairly compelling evidence for five
characterizations regarding what Americans know: (1) the average American is poorly
informed but not uninformed; (2) aggregate levels of political knowledge have re-
mained relatively stable over the past 50 years; (3) Americans appear to be slightly less
informed about politics than are citizens of other comparable nations; (4) "average"
levels of knowledge mask important differences across groups; and (5) knowledge is
tied to many attributes of "good" citizenship.
The Average American Is Poorly Informed, but Not Uninformed
Over 50 years of survey research on Americans' knowledge of politics leads to several
consistent conclusions. The most powerful and influential of these conclusions is that
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the "average" citizen is woefully uninformed about political institutions and pro-
cesses, substantive policies and socioeconomic conditions, and important political ac-
tors such as elected officials and political parties (Bennett, 1988; Campbell, Converse,
Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964, 1975; Ferejohn, 1990; Neuman, 1986). This
conclusion has been reinforced, even mythologized, by popular press accounts of
public ignorance, as when a 1986 ABCfWashington Post poll reported that, shortly
after the widely covered Geneva summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorba-
chev, a majority ofAmericans could not name the leader of the Soviet Union. A simi-
lar, if less scientific, example was given in a 1991 New York Times column entitled
"That's US. Senator." The article noted:
Several members of the New York State Senate reported last week that they had received
dozens of calls from constituents with urgent advice on how they should vote on the
nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. The trouble was, the nomina-
tion was in the hands of the United States Senate. (p. A4)
Books such as Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind (1987), Diane
Ravitch's and Chester Finn's What Do Our I7-Year-Olds Know? (1987), and E. D.
Hirsch's Cultural Literacy (1988) have also contributed to this negative image of the
American public. Indeed, D. Charles Whitney and Ellen Wartella conclude that a
"virtual cottage industry has arisen in the past few years in making out the Ameri-
can public as a bunch of ignoramuses" (1989, p. 9). This characterization is so well
established that, according to John Ferejohn, "Nothing strikes the student of public
opinion and democracy more forcefully than the paucity of information most peo-
ple possess about politics" (Ferejohn, 1990, p. 3). Evidence from recent presidential
campaigns has done little to rehabilitate the American voter's image. For example, a
1992 report by the Center for the Study of Communication at the University of
Massachusetts found that while 86% of a random sample of likely voters knew that
the Bush's family dog was named Millie and 89% knew that Murphy Brown was the
TV character criticized by Dan Quayle, only 15% knew that both candidates fa-
vored the death penalty and only 5% knew that both had proposed cuts in the capi-
tal gains tax.
There is seemingly no end to the examples one can find to illustrate the public's ig-
norance of politics. The single most commonly known fact about President George
Herbert Walker Bush's opinions while he was president was that he hated broccoli.
More people were able to identify Judge Wapner (host of the television series The
People's Court) than ChiefJustices Burger or Rehnquist. More people know John Len-
non than Karl Marx, or know Bill Cosby than either of their U.S. senators. More peo-
ple know who said "What's Up Doc," "Hi Yo Silver," or "Come Up and See Me
Sometime" than "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death," "The Only Thing We Have
to Fear Is Fear Itself," or "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick." More people knew
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that Pete Rose was accused of gambling than could name any of the five U.S. senators
accused of unethical conduct in the savings and loan scandal. This list, of course,
could go on.
However, while there is no question that levels of public knowledge are less impres-
sive than "an informed observer" might hope, a more systematic overview of the past 50
years of survey research on what Americans know about politics reveals a much more
complex picture than normally assumed. In doing research for our book, What Ameri-
cans Know About Politics and Why It Matters, Scott Keeter and I collected over 2000 sur-
vey questions tapping factual knowledge of politics that were asked over the past 50
years. These questions covered a range of topics one might expect an informed citizen to
know, including knowledge of institutions and processes (for example, how a bill be-
comes a law, or what rights are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution), of substantive is-
sues and indicators of the day (for example, whether there is a federal budget deficit or
surplus, or the percentage ofAmericans living in poverty), and ofpublic figures and po-
litical organizations (for example, the name of your U.S. representative, the stands of
presidential candidates on the key issues of the day, or which party controls the Senate).
Unsurprisingly, the average level of knowledge was low-only 4 in 10 of these ques-
tions could be answered correctly by over half of those surveyed. But the average alone
does not tell the full story. Many ofthe more commonly known facts included rudimen-
tary but potentially important pieces of information such as details about the separation
ofpowers across branches and levels ofgovernment; the definitions ofkey terms such as
veto, inflation, or party platform; civil rights such as the constitutional guarantee to a
trial by jury, free speech, and religious freedom; the stands ofpresidential candidates and
political parties on some of the major issues of the day (such as social security, health
care, and foreign relations), social and economic conditions (such as the existence of a
budget deficit or surplus, or the illiteracy rate), as well as other pieces of information.
None of this is to suggest that Americans are generally well informed. Among the
6 in 10 questions that less than half of the public could answer (and the I in 4 that
fewer than a quarter of the public could answer) were many facts that seem equally or
more crucial to effective citizenship: definitions of key terms such as liberal, conserva-
tive, primary elections, or the bill of rights; knowledge of many individual and collec-
tive rights guaranteed by the Constitution; the names or issue stands of most public
officials below the level of president or governor; candidate and party stands on many
important issues of the day; key social conditions such as the unemployment rate or
the percentage of the public living in poverty or without health insurance; how much
of the federal budget is spent on defense, foreign aid, or social welfare; and so on. Fur-
ther, there is little evidence that citizens are most knowledgeable about those things
that are arguably most important. For example, there is little substantive reason for
most Americans to know the name of the vice president, but not the name of their
U.S. representative or senator. It does suggest, however, that Americans are neither as
uninformed nor as unwilling or incapable of being informed as is often stated.
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Another way to make this point is to look at the results of surveys that include
multiple knowledge items. For example, in a 50-question "quiz" covering a range of
topics designed to tap knowledge of three key areas (institutions and processes, cur-
rent issues and social conditions, and key political actors and groups) the average
score for a national sample ofAmerican adults was about 5°% correct-evidence per-
haps ofan under-informed public, but not ofan uninformed one.
Aggregate Levels ofPolitical Knowledge Have Remained
Relatively Stable over the Past 50 Years
Clearly, the average American is poorly informed about politics when compared to an
"idealized" citizen. Another, arguably "fairer," way to assess the state of political
knowledge among the American public is to compare current levels of knowledge to
past levels. While data allowing for a systematic comparison of knowledge levels over
the past 50 years is less comprehensive than one would hope, the evidence strongly
suggests that Americans are about as informed about politics today as they were 50
years ago (Bennett, 1988, 1989; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 105-134; Neuman,
1986, pp. 14-17; Smith, 1989, pp. 159-222).
These findings could be seen as good news or bad news, depending on one's perspec-
tive. The good news is that, despite concerns over the quality ofeducation, the decline
in newspaper readership, the rise of "sound-bite" journalism, the explosion in national
political issues, and the waning commitment to civic engagement, citizens appear no less
informed about politics today than they were half a century ago. The bad news is that
despite an unprecedented expansion in public education, a communications revolution
that has shattered national and international boundaries, and the increasing relevance of
national and international events and policies to the daily lives of Americans, citizens
appear no more informed about politics today than they were halfa century ago.
This relative stability in levels of political knowledge should not be mistakenly
interpreted as suggesting that Americans are unable to monitor changes in the politi-
cal environment. As evidence of this, consider the following example. In most years
for which data are available, majorities of the public were correctly able to place the
Democratic Party and its presidential candidates to the left of their Republican coun-
terparts on issues such as women's role in society, aid to minorities, jobs, education,
and school desegregation (Stimson, 1990, pp. 352-353). However, while the stands of
the Democratic and Republican patties are usually distinct on these issues, in many
years the distinctions are subtle at best, making it more difficult for citizens to learn
where the parties stand relative to each other. When the stands of the parties become
more distinct, substantial portions of the public appear to learn this fact.
For example, in 1956 and 1960 about 20% of those surveyed saw the Democratic
Party as more liberal on federal aid to minorities than the Republican Party, while
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about the same percentage saw Republicans as the more liberal party. The two parties
were rated similarly on their stands regarding school desegregation. This balance is re-
flective of the actual stands of the two parties during this period. While Truman led
the way to desegregating the military, the initial efforts to pass civil rights legislation
in the 1940S and 1950S were often championed by Republicans. Moreover, the ruling
in Brown v. BoardofEducation was handed down during Eisenhower's presidency, and
it was Eisenhower who issued the executive order to desegregate the schools in Little
Rock, Arkansas. By 1968, however, both civil rights and federal aid to blacks had be-
come strong planks in the Democratic Party platform, while the Republican Party
had moved away from its long-term emphasis on the former, and often actively op-
posed the latter. This shift was not lost on a significant portion of the American pub-
lic: in 1964 and 1968 between 50 and 60% of those surveyed saw the Democrats as the
more liberal party on aid to minorities, while only 7 to nOlo saw the Republican Party
as the more liberal. And 50 to 56% saw the Democrats as more liberal on school deseg-
regation, compared to only 7 to 9% who saw the Republicans in this light.
A similar example of the public's ability to survey the changing political terrain is
provided by the parties' developing stands on the role of women in society. In 1972
and 1976, about a third of the public saw the Democratic Party as more liberal than
the Republican Party on this issue. In contrast, only about 10% of the public saw the
Republican Party as more liberal. Again, these modest differences fairly accurately re-
flected the small differences between the two parties in the early 1970S (for example,
while the Democratic Party and candidates were somewhat more committed to femi-
nist issues, both parties supported the ERA and all four '72 and '76 presidential candi-
dates were nominally pro-choice). By 1980, however, the Republican Party had become
firmly "captured" by social conservatives who aggressively expounded more conserva-
tive rhetoric on issues such as the role ofwomen (for example, in 1980 the Republican
Party removed its support for the ERA from its platform, and added planks advocat-
ing a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion and supporting legislation "pro-
tecting and defending the traditional American family"). At the same time, the
Democratic Party strengthened its commitment to feminist concerns, as Klein (1984)
notes, including:
support for the ERA, opposition to reversals of past ratification of the ERA, a pledge to
hold no national or regional party meetings in unratified states, endorsement of the 1973
Supreme Court decision allowing abortion, support for increased federal funds for child-
care programs, and commitment to the principle ofequal pay for equal work. (p. 157)
As a result of this more sharply defined difference between the two parties, the per-
centage of the public knowing that the Democratic Party was the more liberal on
women's roles in society increased to around 60% in 1980 and 1984, while the percent-
age seeing the Republicans as the more liberal party held about constant at 10%.
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Americans Appear to Be Slightly Less InformedAbout Politics
Than Are Citizens ofOther Comparable Nations
Yet another way to assess Americans' political knowledge is to compare them to citi-
zens of other countries. Good comparative data are again relatively sparse, especially
for knowledge of domestic politics. What evidence there is provides a somewhat am-
biguous picture. Recent evidence on knowledge of foreign affairs suggests that Ameri-
cans lag behind residents of many western nations in awareness of key political actors
and events. For example, surveys conducted in eight nations (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Mexico, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States) in 1994 by
the Times Mirror Center found that, in terms of the percentage able to answer the
current events questions correctly, Americans placed third on one item (knowing
which nation was threatening to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty),
sixth on two others (knowing the ethnic group that had conquered much of Bosnia,
and the name of the group that Israel had recently reached a peace accord with), and
came in seventh (naming the president of Russia) and eighth (identifying Bourros
Bourros Ghali) on the other two. Of seven nations for which summary tabulations
were made, Americans had the second-lowest mean number correct (only Spain fell
behind; Mexico was not tabulated). Thirty-seven percent ofAmericans missed all of
the questions, the highest percentage among the seven nations to do so.
Research by Baker, Bennett, Bennett, and Flickenger (1994), comparing knowl-
edge ofnational legislatures in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, also sug-
gests that Americans are less informed than are citizens of other nations. U.S. citizens
averaged less than three correct answers on a IO-item scale measuring knowledge of
the U.S. Congress, compared to Great Britains, who averaged over 6 correct our of IO
questions about their parliament, and Canadians, who averaged a remarkable 9.8 cor-
rect out ofII questions abour their parliament. l
A somewhat less grim picture emerges from a 1986 cross-national survey that asked
abour world leaders. Americans equaled or exceeded respondents from the other four
nations in their ability to name their own head of state (99% for Americans, 99% for
the French, 96% for the British, 95% for West Germans, and 89% for the Italians).
Americans were abour as likely as the others to know the prime minister ofJapan, but
were considerably less able to identify the heads of state ofWestern European nations.
And the five-nation survey that formed the basis for Almond and Verba's The Civic
Culture (1963) found a considerably higher percentage of Americans and Germans
able to name four or more party leaders when compared with the English, Italians, or
Mexicans. Americans were behind the Germans, but comparable to the British, in the
ability to name four or more cabinet offices.
Finally, a 1988 National Geographic survey asked representative samples of adult
citizens from nine countries to locate 16 "places" on a map of the world (14 countries
and two bodies of water). Overall, Americans correctly located an average of 8.6
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places, putting them sixth out of the nine countries included in the survey. More spe-
cifically, Americans were above average in locating places relatively close to them (e.g.,
Canada, Mexico, Central America, the Pacific Ocean, and the United States itself),
while they were below average in identifying areas that are geographically more dis-
tant (such as the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden, Egypt, and the
Persian Gulf).
"Average" Levels ofKnowledge Mask Important
Differences Across Groups
The portrait of the American citizen presented thus far is generally consistent with the
call for a more realistic set of expectations regarding the informational requisites of
civic life. This picture becomes more complicated, and to my mind, problematic
when one looks at the variance in knowledge across citizens, however. Too often "the
citizenry" is described in monolithic terms. The evidence suggests, however, that there
are dramatic differences in how informed Americans are. For example, as noted
above, a 50-question "quiz" of political knowledge given to a national sample of
American adults produced an average score of almost 50% correct. But the most in-
formed 30% of the sample averaged better than 7-in-ro correct answers, while the
least informed 30% could only answer I in 4 questions correctly. In short, there is no
single portrait of the American citizen: a substantial percentage is very informed, an
equally large percentage is very poorly informed, and the plurality of citizens fall
somewhere in between.
One could argue, as Michael Schudson (1998) does, that these differences simply
reflect the fact that "[t]here must be some distribution across people and across issues
of the cognitive demands of self-government" (p. 3ro), and ultimately that civic life
must "integrate citizenry competence with specialized expert resources" (pp. 311-312).
The problem with this view is that differences in levels of knowledge parallel other,
more traditional indicators of political, social, and economic power such as race, gen-
der, class, and age.
The extent to which knowledge levels vary across groups of citizens is clearly seen
using data from two surveys conducted in the late 19805. While the size of the knowl-
edge gaps about national politics varies from item to item, the overall pattern is com-
pelling: men are more informed than women; whites are more informed than blacks;
those with higher incomes are more informed than those with lower incomes,2 and
older citizens are more informed than younger ones.
The extent of these differences can be summarized in several ways. Of the 68 ques-
tions asked across the two surveys, for only five was the percentage correct for women
as high or higher than for men, and in no case was the percentage correct for blacks as
high as for whites, or was the percentage correct for low-income citizens as high as that
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for upper-income ones. The comparison across age cohorts reveals a somewhat more
variable pattern, though 55 of the 68 questions were answered correctly by a greater
percentage of "pre-baby boomers" than "post-baby boomers."3
The sizes of these gaps in knowledge are substantial. For example, the median per-
cent correct across all the items in the 1989 survey for men was 1.35 times that for
women, the median percent correct for pre-baby boomers was 1.38 times that for
post-baby boomers, the median percent correct for more affluent citizens was 1.59
times that of relatively poor citizens, and the median percent correct for whites was
over twice that for blacks.
The cumulative effect of these question-by-question differences can be gauged by
summing across all the items to make a knowledge index. Fully three quarters of the
women in the 1989 survey scored below the median for men. Substantially more than
three quarters of those from families earning under $20,000 a year scored below the
median for those earning over $5°,000, as was the case for post-baby boomers when
compared to pre-baby boomers. And three quarters of black Americans scored below
three quarters ofwhite Americans, a knowledge gap of dramatic proportions. Similar
patterns were found in the 1988 data.4
As a final demonstration of the extent of group differences in political knowledge,
one can compare the average scores on the two knowledge scales (measured as the per-
cent of the questions answered correctly) for members of different segments of the
population. The average score for the total 1989 sample was 49% while for the 1988
sample it was 5%, meaning that the "typical" citizen could answer about half the ques-
tions correctly. However, this average masks substantial differences across different
segments of the population. These differences are especially dramatic when consid-
ered for groups ofcitizens that combine the advantages and disadvantages associated
with age, class, race, and gender. The most informed citizens were older, white males
whose family income exceeded $50,000 (65% correct on the 1989 scale and 76% cor-
rect on the 1988 scale). These scores were over two and a half times higher than those
achieved by the least informed group in our sample: younger black women whose
family income was less than $20,000 a year. More generally, the patterns demon-
strated in both samples show the exceptionally close fit between political knowledge
and socioeconomic status. Surprisingly, the size of the race, gender, and class knowl-
edge gaps has remained relatively unchanged over the past 40 years, and the size of the
generational knowledge gap appears to have increased.
Knowledge Is Tied to Many Attributes ofCCGood" Citizenship
Politics is ultimately about "who gets what" from government, or as David Easton
(1965, p. 3) put it, "the authoritative allocation of goods, services, and values." With
this in mind, evidence of systematic differences in political knowledge that are tied to
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other socioeconomic indicators of political power should give one pause. The politi-
cal significance of these knowledge gaps depends, however, on whether or not knowl-
edge matters to effective citizenship. While there is some disagreement on this, my
own work and my reading of the larger literature strongly suggests that informed citi-
zens are "better" citizens in a number ofways.
Specifically, research has found that more-informed citizens are more accepting
of democratic norms such as political tolerance; are more efficacious about poli-
tics; are more likely to be interested in, follow, and discuss politics; and are more
likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways, including voting, working for a
political party, and attending local community meetings (Delli Carpini & Keeter,
1996; Junn, 1991; Leighley, 1991; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995;
Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Research also suggests that more-informed citi-
zens are more likely to have opinions about the pressing issues of the day (Delli
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Krosnick & Milburn, 1990), are more likely to hold stable
opinions over time (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Erikson & Knight, 1993; Feld-
man, 1989), are more likely to hold opinions that are ideologically consistent with
each other (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 235-238; McCloskey
& Zaller, 1984, pp. 250-251; Neuman, 1986, pp. 64-67; Nie, Verba, & Perrocik,
1979, p. 154; Zaller, 1986, pp. IO-n), and are less likely to change their opinions in
the face of new but tangential or misleading information (Kinder & Sanders, 1990;
Lanoue, 1992) but more likely to change in the face of new relevant or compelling
information (Zaller, 1992).
There is also evidence that political knowledge affects the opinions held by differ-
ent socioeconomic groups (for example, groups based on race, class, gender, and age
differences). More-informed citizens within these groups hold opinions that are both
significantly different from less-informed citizens with similar demographic charac-
teristics, and that are arguably more consistent with their material circumstances
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 238-251).5 For example, informed women are more
supportive ofgovernment programs designed to protect women's rights, informed but
economically disadvantaged citizens are more supportive ofgovernment programs de-
signed to provide jobs and improve their standard of living, and so forth. These group
differences are large enough to suggest that aggregate opinion on a number of politi-
cal issues would be significantly different and more representative of the public inter-
est were citizens more fully and equitably informed about politics (Delli Carpini &
Keeter, 1996; Althaus, 1998).
Finally, political knowledge seems to increase citizens' ability to consistently con-
nect their policy views to their evaluations of public officials and political parties, as
well as to their political behavior. For example, more-informed citizens are more likely
to identify with the political party, approve of the performance of office holders, and
vote for candidates whose policy stands are most consistent with their own views (Al-
varez, 1997; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 251-258).
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Summary and Conclusion: Informing the Public's Discretion
Not surprisingly, findings such as those summarized above have produced a great deal
of concern. "It seems remarkable," wrote Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Wil-
liam McPhee, "that democracies have survived through the centuries.... That is the
paradox. Individual voters today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a demo-
cratic system of government outlined by political theorists" (1954, p. 312).
It is not too great a simplification to suggest that most public opinion theory and
research that has emerged over the last 40 years has been an attempt to resolve this ap-
parent paradox. There is a consensus that most citizens are politically uninformed.
There is no consensus, however, on the causes or implications of this state of civic af-
fairs. Many observers, starting from the premise that an informed citizenry is the sine
qua non of democracy, conclude that American politics is in crisis: that the tensions
inherent in its theory and practice have made it either ungovernable, undemocratic,
or both. Robert Entman, in his aptly titled book, Democracy Without Citizens, argues
that "people who participate regularly and knowledgeably form a distinct minority,"
and thus, the U.S. system "represents the general public less well than Americans de-
serve" (1989, p. 28). Paul Blumberg (1990) puts it more starkly:
America's embarrassing little secret ... is that vast numbers ofAmericans are ignorant,
not merely of the specialized details of government which ordinary citizens cannot be
expected to master, but of the most elementary political facts- information so basic as
to challenge the central tenet of democratic government itself. (p. I)
However, not everyone agrees that low levels of civic knowledge constitute a threat
to democratic politics. Starting from a "realist's view," many believe that the need for
a generally informed citizenry is overstated. For these scholars the solution to
Berelson's paradox is not to change citizens-or the system in which they operate-
but to rethink the definition ofdemocracy itself. This view is reflected in the words of
E. E. Schattschneider (1960), who wrote:
It is an outrage to attribute the failures ofAmerican democracy to the ignorance and stu-
pidity of the masses. The most disastrous shortcomings of the system have been those of
the intellectuals whose concepts of democracy have been amazingly rigid and uninven-
tive. (pp. 135-136)
In this view, "real" democracy functions through some combination of govern-
ment by experts, the availability of"attentive publics," the resourceful use ofheuristics
and information shortcuts by citizens, and/or the beneficent effects of "collective ra-
tionality" wherein the whole of citizen awareness is greater than the sum of its parts.
Much of this theory and research is motivated by a desire to salvage liberal democracy
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from its critics, to show, as Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro have put it, that "or-
dinary citizens are not to be feared" and that "skepticism and disdain [for the civic ca-
pacity of the public] are not well founded" (1992, pp. xi, I).
It is my argument, however, that in attempting to rehabilitate the image of ordi-
nary citizens by downplaying the possibility or necessity of an informed public,
scholars and practitioners run an equally great risk of selling both citizens and de-
mocracy short. Put more bluntly, I am suggesting that democracy becomes more re-
sponsive and responsible the more informed, and the more equitably informed, is its
citizenry. Suggestions that the negative consequences of low levels of political infor-
mation can be offset by an informed elite, collective rationality, heuristic decision-
making, and the like underestimate the importance of political information to these
very theories. For elites to represent the general public effectively, they must still be
accountable to the public. For collective opinions and decisions to accurately reflect
the public interest, either all citizens must be able to discern and articulate their inter-
ests, or the portion that can do so must be representative of the larger citizenry. And
for citizens to use simplifying strategies in reaching their individual decisions, they
must still have enough information to assure that these cues effectively tie their inter-
ests to their political behavior. This would be true even if political interests were al-
ways consensual or if those with information were representative of those without it.
It is all the more important when interests clash and when the disparities in informa-
tion are closely tied to different conceptions of the public good.
I am not arguing that contemporary democracy requires that all citizens be expert
on all facets ofnational politics, but I do suggest that the more citizens are passingly in-
formed about the issues of the day, the behavior ofpolitical leaders, and the rules under
which they operate, the better off they are-the better off we are. Similarly, I acknowl-
edge that even democracies require "information elites" -experts who are especially in-
formed about particular issues and to whom the rest of the citizenry turns for advice or
leadership. But the greater the range of these experts, and the greater the percentage of
the general public that is able to fulfill these roles (even as intermediaries in the flow of
information), the more democratic that flow of information is likely to be.
During a public lecture on astronomy in which he described the earth's orbit
around the sun, Bertrand Russell was challenged by an elderly woman in the audience
who exclaimed, "What you told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate sup-
ported on the back of a giant tortoise." Russell, thinking he had the woman trapped
by her own logic, asked, "But what is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever,
young man, very clever," was the woman's response, "But it's turtles all the way
down!"6 In some ways this exchange captures the shortcoming ofarguments intended
to demonstrate that democracy can operate without benefit of citizens who meet civic
requisites such as knowledge of politics. Competent civic decision making may rest
"on the backs" ofelites or some simple heuristic shortcuts. But on what do these elites
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rest? These heuristics? To argue it is "elites all the way down" is to define away the
meaning of even limited democracy. And to suggest it is "heuristics all the way down"
is to destroy their conceptual utility-that they are information shortcuts. In the end
one cannot use these models to argue that democracy can operate effectively without
an informed public because, ultimately, democracy rests on the backs of its citizens.
Notes
1. The specific questions asked varied from nation to nation, making comparisons of specific
scores somewhat problematic. Nonetheless, the general point-that Americans are less in-
formed about their national legislature than are citizens of Canada or Great Britain-is
compelling.
2. "Low income" was defined as family income below $20,000; "middle income" as between
$20,000 and $50,000; and "high income" as over $50,000.
3. Pre-baby boomers are defined as those born prior to 1946; baby boomers are those born
between 1946 and 1964; and post-baby boomers are those born after 1964.
4. The one exception was race, where the knowledge gap was less dramatic than in the 1989 sur-
vey (approximately three-quarters of blacks scored below the median for whites). We attribute
the smaller knowledge gap to the predominance ofparty-oriented questions in the 1988 survey.
5. In some cases greater information also seems to lead "advantaged" citizens (e.g., whites) to hold
opinions that are more supportive ofgovernment policies designed to assist the less-advantaged
(e.g., minorities).
6. The story, which is probably apocryphal, has been retold in several fashions. This version is
found in Stephen Hawking's A BriefHistory ofTime (1988).
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